It has been a long time since the Muslim world was so doctrinally divided, but from this desperate situation good things for the Muslim world could develop

by LAITH SAUD

The issue of sectarianism in Iraq has diverse implications. First, the issue has lent itself to the debate over American policy in the country. Politicians argue over the role of the US amidst a "civil war". For the non-Muslim world, sectarianism in Iraq has shattered myths of a monolithic, single-minded, Muslim world community. With the assistance of a pro-war media this new appreciation for diversity amongst Muslims, however, has been coupled with suggestions that Muslims somehow cannot "get along" with one another. Last, but certainly not least, Muslims have been caught off guard by an issue that most were not familiar with in their respective communities. Sectarianism has never been as severe a problem in the Muslim world as it is currently being portrayed. The question then arises: why now? For centuries Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, amongst others, have interacted, intermarried, traded and corresponded. When we examine the current crises in Iraq, some issues need to be raised as to the Muslim response.

First and foremost, I do not feel it is necessary to address the issue of whether the occupying forces provoked sectarianism in Iraq. Of course they did. As someone who was born in Iraq of a Sunni father and Shi'a mother and has countless family members who are Sunni, Shi'a and even Kurdish, the current climate of violence in Iraq is incomprehensible without acknowledging the role played by the US in engendering it. Upon invasion and occupation, the provisional authority in Iraq, headed by Paul Bremer, systematically marginalized non-sectarian technocrats in favor of sectarian ideologues. Many of these individuals had not been in Iraq for decades and had little more than a sectarian platform to stand on. Yet American involvement in this regard is somehow still up for debate. Debate is usually healthy but debating the obvious is not. This protracted discussion stems from preponderance over the image of America in the world. Is America truly innocent or is America evil? The problem with this sort of questioning is two-fold: first, by continuing to debate the factuality of American "innocence" in Iraq, we unwittingly perpetuate the status quo by holding the door open to American involvement in Iraqi affairs. So long as the "jury remains out"-so to speak-on the value of American policy, we delay the withdrawal of American troops by maintaining the very possibility that the occupation can yield positive results. Illegal and immoral occupations should not be extended indefinite deadlines before they are forthrightly condemed; this is simply not rational, yet this is the continued case in Iraq. I am not suggesting that an end to the occupation will end the crisis in Iraq, but it is a necessary condition for doing so.

What we are more concerned with, rather, is the second more serious problem implicit in this debate. An exclusive concern with American involvement in Iraq results in an American-centric discourse. It sidelines what is a more essential issue, namely the role played by Muslim institutions. Asserting that the presence of the Americans (or the British, or the French, or the Israelis) in Muslim lands is a source of sectarianism in the Muslim world is a redundant and, ultimately, useless claim. Of course foreign occupation is a source of division as the standard dictum of "divide and conquer" applies in all occupations. But to continue to blame occupations (or any other type of foreign involvement, covert or otherwise) is like blaming the wind for carrying our sails while we refuse to bring the sails down. The wind does not stop blowing, regardless of how desperately we wish that it might.

Sectarianism has taken on a momentum of its own and has manifested itself in the discourse of Muslim institutions. Sheikhs from Saudi Arabia denounce Shi'a as "non-believers" while sheikhs in Iran do the same in regards to Sunnis. This cycle of excommunication is first un-Islamic, but secondly it also seems to be moving along unhindered by more knowledgeable voices. In other places, during times of political and social uncertainty many have taken recourse in the only security available-identity. This trend is not limited to Iraq; however, Iraq is only the most extreme case. Iraqis feel they have little choice but to seek forms of association for the sake of mutual security in the absence of a strong national identity, politicized and made concrete in the form of a state. This trend is seething just beneath the surface of many Muslim countries; we now see evidence of it in Lebanon, as the weakness of the state was exposed in the face of Israeli brutality this past summer. Sectarianism is also beginning to rear its ugly head in the Gulf, as Iran has been able to shrewdly challenge and consequently undermine the authority of Gulf state regimes. As the vulnerability of many Muslim states becomes increasingly known, is the larger Muslim world going to become subject to the same sort of sectarian instability seen in Iraq? Perhaps, but this does not have to be the case.

As I said before, sectarianism has never been a major problem in the Muslim world; so it may seem strange to suggest that Muslim institutions have presided over its development. Yet they have, precisely because of their relative silence over the issue. Muslim have been permitted to practice their faith in an Islamic vacuum-usually becoming thoroughly acquainted with Jewish and Christian belief, at least more so than Jews or Christians are familiar with Muslim belief, but somehow not being exposed to different currents within the rich and diverse heritage that is Islam. This was not always the case.