by MICHAEL VICENTÉ PÉREZ

Despite Hamas’ electoral success, unity eludes Palestinians as Hamas and Fatah battle over the terms of a coalition government. In addition, international sanctions have added fuel to a raging internal fire, stretching thin an already dire economy and increasing the anger of the people. The Palestinian National Accord seems to be a first step towards creating Palestinian national unity; whether it will lead to the lifting of international sanctions remains to be seen. 

The Palestinian struggle is generally understood to be an effort to end Israeli colonization and assert the dignity, humanity, and rights of the Palestinian people. As such, Palestinians face one of the biggest challenges ever encountered by a colonized nation: an oppressor with the international status of a victim. Despite over 50 years of relentless colonization driven by an ideology of religious and racial exclusivity, Israel continues to hold its position as a haven for the victimized Jews of Europe supported by the strongest nation in the world, the United States.

After decades of peace efforts and resistance, the Palestinians are now confronting a new task of immense difficulty and historical importance: political unity. Since Hamas’ sweeping victory in last year’s elections, Palestinians have organized countless meetings between the leading figures of Fatah and Hamas in order to create a unified platform. From Damascus to Mecca, Palestinian President, Mahmood Abbas, and Hamas leader and Palestinian Prime Minister, Ismail Haniyeh, have tried to curb the surge in factional violence and find a political solution to the factional disunity plaguing the Palestinian scene. Certainly the quest for a solid fist of Palestinian politics is nothing new. As far back as the catastrophe of 1948 (al-Nakba), one can say that Palestinians have been wrestling with the problem of national unity. The formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964, for example, attests to the struggles and success of past efforts to establish a unified Palestinian front. But today, with over 30 Palestinians killed in the last week during battles between Palestinians in what has been called both a proxy and civil war, the fragile fabric of Palestinian political unity stands to be unraveled.

It should be said that the outbreak of violence in Gaza and the West Bank isn’t just about Palestinian unity. While popular press sources offer the misguided narrative of Palestinian factional conflict to explain the violence, the forceful hands of Israeli and US policy remain unseen. Thus, as with most colonial stories, Palestinians have been branded with the mark of ineptitude that implicitly supports the white man’s burden and the “golden years” of occupation when Palestinians “got along” under Israel’s iron fist.

Without a doubt, the current conflict between Palestinian groups has a lot to do with the ongoing Israeli occupation and the crippling sanctions imposed by the so-called international community (aka the Quartet), which consists of Israel’s primary backer, the US, along with the UN, EU, and Russia. It is also a direct consequence of financial and military support for Abbas and Fatah by Israel and the US. Their aim: to set up a proxy war that can keep Hamas on the ropes while Israel furthers its colonization of Palestinian lands and blames the Palestinians for the absence of peace. But in order to appreciate recent efforts to create a consolidated Palestinian political front in the form of a National Unity government, we have to give the internal crisis of Palestinian politics as much importance as the external crisis presented by Israel and the Quartet.

Despite initial limited media attention to Hamas during the Al-Aqsa Intifada,1 the group was thrust into the international spotlight after its sweeping victory in the Palestinian national elections Jan. 25, 2006. Winning 74 of the 132 seats on the Palestinian Legislative Council, Hamas succeeded in asserting its political position in the national history of the Palestinian people.

Infamous in the West for its role in organizing suicide operations against Israel, Hamas’ electoral victory shed light on the organization’s significance in the social and political fabric of Palestinian society. Indeed, its militant stance against the Israeli occupation during the first and second Intifada was only half the story. For many Palestinians, Hamas’ militancy was always inseparable from its character as a religious movement grounded in charitable institutions, such as schools, clinics and youth activity centers.

Politically, Hamas has historically provided an alternative to the secular nationalism offered by the Palestine Liberation Organization, particularly Yasser Arafat’s Fatah. Rejecting the framework of negotiations with Israel, Hamas never joined the PLO. It preferred to keep a distinctly Islamic expression of national liberation encompassing a religious struggle for all of historic Palestine.[2] Hamas’ approach, however, never entailed direct confrontation with the PLO or, after the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority.

Knowing its limitations in power and popularity, Hamas has traditionally employed a strategy of political pragmatism by testing the waters before diving in. Thus, during the Oslo period, the group chose to limit its participation in the Pales-tinian elections through a nationwide boycott. Running on individual tickets, Hamas carefully balanced its rejectionist attitude toward the Oslo framework with its basic need to stay in the game.