Does the Pope's vision of the future of Europe include the full participation of the Muslim communities? And how far should Muslims go in helping realize that vision?

by H.A. HELLYER

'The Future of Europe In Islam': that was the title of the panel discussion that the Muslim Youth Helpline hosted almost a year ago in London. The controversial nature of the title was likely the point; in the year preceding it, most of the conferences relating to the Muslim community were incredibly depressing, and usually reactionary.

Not that one, where for once the problems regarding integration, radicalism and so forth were not the sole emphasis when discussing Europe and its Muslim communities. More positive attitudes emerged, with speakers indicating they had high hopes. High hopes for Muslim communities in Europe and high hopes for the contribution of Muslim Europeans to Islam, just as Muslim Arabs, Muslim Africans and Muslim Asians had contributed to Islam in the past.

But there was a clearly articulated thread that evening: they also had high hopes for Europe as a whole, as integral parts of it. They did not have any interest in building a Europe that they were not integral parts of.

I use the word "integralization" to describe a process by which communities do not "integrate", "assimilate" or "segregate" into/from their societies, but go beyond those paradigms. The basic premise is that an integral community is not a separate, distinct community from the mainstream, but is identifiable on the basis of its core principles. It is not so much the "melting pot" principle, but something a little different; instead of becoming another piece of lettuce in the salad bowl of society, the integral community is a vinegar that seasons and invigorates the whole salad in a subtle, yet deeply felt manner.

On Monday 24th September last year, the Pope met with a delegation of leaders from Muslim countries to discuss his recent comments in Germany that caused a huge uproar when he repeated the words of a medieval Byzantine Emperor that described the Prophet as violent. That saga is now thankfully no longer front-page news; the Pope went to Turkey in November, and essentially "buried the hatchet" with many Muslims by his great deference to the Muslim community during that visit.

Yet, the account of the reactions to the Pope's speech was surprising in that most did not realize that the most relevant long-term issue to Muslim communities was not this citation. Were the Pope intent on insulting Muslims, he would have chosen another forum to do so, and he certainly would not have retracted such comments. On the contrary, he could have made a harsher statement, and stuck to it, and likely receiving enough support from the European mainstream to make it bearable. (In this sense, Muslims responding with violence in some areas merely proved that they agreed with the violent image they were supposedly protesting about.)

The Pope certainly has a perspective on Islam and Muslims, which is based on five main points, as follows.

* In the Vatican's public policy Islam is not so much a violent threat, as it is an external non-European reality that Europe must engage with. Sometimes that engagement is positive. The Pope's political stances on the Muslim world are often in its favor: he opposed the war on Iraq; he opposed the Danish cartoons; and supported the people of Lebanon in its recent conflict with Israel. It does not appear he is aligning the Vatican with any existing negative political agenda elsewhere although, like much of the world, he fears radical violent tendencies.

* The Pope has decided to focus more on ecumenical activity within Christian groups (Orthodox, in particular) and less on dialogue with Islam than his predecessor; this is clear from his internal restructuring of the Vatican and its staff in this area. Most poignantly, in February of this year, he reassigned the Vatican's top experts on Islam from his position as the head of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue to representing the Vatican to Egypt and the Arab League. This was a move seen by many to be a demotion, and his name was conspicuously missing from the list of appointments to the College of Cardinals revealed a few days before his reassignment. That Council was also merged with the Pontifical Council for Culture, instead of having its own distinct realm of responsibility.

* This Pope is a traditionalist who supported the reforms of Vatican II: i.e., he does not consider modernity to be completely beneficial, but accepts that the Church has to update itself in order to properly engage modernity. He may recognize Islam as a possible ally in that engagement, but at present, he separates that from the future of European civilisation.

* That qualified recognition is not unconditional; the Pope is cautious about the prospects of Islam being an ally against modernity without it engaging in some sort of re-interpretation process. At a private meeting earlier this year between the Pope and some of his consultants on Islam, he viewed the reconciliation between Islam and modernity to be possible, but difficult. It does not appear the Catholic Church favours a "Reformation", for itself or Islam. Yet, just as the Church underwent Vatican II in the 1960s, it may positively envisage some sort of internal Muslim "Re-evaluation".