Framing the War on Terror PDF  | Print |  Email
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Most importantly, many have claimed that "blue jeans and Playboy" brought down the Soviet Union as much as strong military deterrence. In sharp contrast, it is precisely America's military power and popular culture, and their perceived threat to Muslims, that extremists exploit to gain support. In short, much of what worked in the Cold War will have the exact opposite effect now.

From many Muslims' point of view, the conflict with the United States is about policy, not principles. Through Muslim eyes, it looks like a global civil rights struggle much more than another clash between superpowers. When viewed through this new perspective, seemingly inexplicable crises, such as the Muslim reaction to the Danish cartoons, come into sharper focus as does a more effective strategy forward.

Thoughtful observers have drawn a comparison between the Danish cartoon controversy and an incident from America's own cultural relations struggle: the 1965 Watts riots. Looking at the cartoon controversy through the analogous lens of race relations uncovers some revealing insights. In both cases, violent riots broke out in reaction to what seemed to outsiders as a "petty offense." In the case of the Watts riot, white police officers in a predominantly black neighborhood pulled over two black males whom they believed were driving while intoxicated. In the case of the cartoons, a Danish newspaper, followed by other European newspapers, printed a cartoon depicting Islam's most venerated figure, the Prophet Muhammad, as a terrorist.

As a result of the Watts riots, 34 people were officially reported killed and more than 1,000 people injured. The Kerner Commission was set up by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967 to study the riots that hit many U.S. cities each summer since 1964 and to provide recommendations. The resulting report pointed to the distinction between the "trigger" (a petty act) and the "cause"-a long list of problems identified by the commission. These included poverty, job and housing discrimination, and unequal education, as well as a deep sense of racism and disrespect on the part of a powerful and affluent white America toward a powerless and poor black America, as personified by the white police officers' treatment of the black men.

Like those who rioted in Watts and in other American cities during the civil rights struggle, Muslim rioters were not angry because they did not understand the value of free speech in principle-many cite this liberty as among the most admired aspects of the West. Instead, the Danish cartoons were simply the "trigger" igniting the combustible fuel of widespread perceptions of Western injustice and disrespect.

Several developments followed the commission's report and the violence that initiated it: Greater attention was paid to the grievances identified by the commission, which were not rendered void simply because people chose a violent way to protest them. Significantly, change occurred in two major areas. The first was policy: Laws were passed and some changed to address these issues, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1968 prohibiting discrimination concerning the sale, rental and financing of housing. The second was a greater cultural sensitivity: It was already slowly becoming less socially acceptable to use racist images of blacks in media. For example, CBS had withdrawn reruns of the Amos 'n' Andy show in 1966, which the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) had been protesting since the 1950s.

Lessons learned from America's civil rights struggle can help clarify how to begin to bridge the divide between the United States and the Muslim world. Thus, a two-pronged approach-outreach to the moderate majority through job creation and support for those who wish to address widely held grievances peacefully-can help diminish the appeal of those who advocate violence.

Dalia E. Mogahed is executive director of The Center for Muslim Studies at the Gallup Organization and coauthor with Prof. John L. Esposito of the forthcoming book Who Speaks for Islam?: What a Billion Muslims Really Think.