Are the mental models guiding post 9/11 policy leading to actions that help to eliminate or inadvertently increase extremism?

by DALIA MOGAHED

More and more U.S. policymakers and intellectuals are drawing an analogy between the Cold War and the war on terror, and are recommending analogous strategies, since both conflicts were fought on the battlefield and over people's minds and hearts. However, recent research by The Gallup Organization on Muslim public opinion around the world points to serious flaws in the "Cold War II" paradigm and the real danger in confusing these two very different conflicts. America's trials and triumphs in its own internal "clash of cultures"-the civil rights struggle-is a more appropriate analogy.

At the heart of Cold War II is a belief that religious fanaticism fuels extremism and therefore replacing Muslims' worldview with Western liberalism is the path to victory against terrorism. To understand the danger of this diagnosis, we must first look at the factors that do and do not drive sympathy for violence.

As a starting point, Muslims hold no monopoly on extremist views. Although 6 percent of the American public thinks attacks where civilians are targets are "completely justified," in Lebanon and Iran, this figure is 2 percent, and in Saudi Arabia, 4 percent. In Europe, Muslims in Berlin, Paris and London are no more likely than their general public counterparts to believe that such attacks are justified and are at least as likely to reject violence, even for a "noble cause."

After analyzing survey data representing more than 90 percent of the global Muslim population, Gallup found that despite widespread anti-American sentiment, only a small minority sympathized with the attacks of 9/11.

Even more significant, there was no correlation between level of religiosity and extremism among Muslims.

Gallup went even further and asked both those who condoned and condemned extremist acts, "Why do you say that?" The responses fly in the face of conventional wisdom. For example, in Indonesia, the largest Muslim majority country, many of those who condemned terrorism cited humanitarian or religious justifications to support their response. One woman said, "Killing one life is as sinful as killing the whole world," paraphrasing verse 5:32 in the Qur'an.

On the other hand, not a single respondent in Indonesia who condoned the attacks of 9/11 cited the Qur'an for justification. Instead, this group's responses were markedly secular and worldly. One respondent said, "The U.S. government is too controlling toward other countries, seems like colonizing."

The real difference between those who condone terrorist acts and all others is politics, not piety. For example, those who sympathize with terrorism cite "occupation and U.S. domination" as their greatest fear for their country and only a small minority agree the U.S. would allow people in the region to fashion their own political future or that it would support democracy in the region. Also, among this group's top responses was the view that to better relations with the Muslim world, the West should stop imposing its beliefs and policies.

Although this group is as likely to say that better relations with the West is of personal concern to them, they are much less likely to believe that the West reciprocates this concern and therefore much less likely to believe that improved relations will ever come. In short, those who sympathize with extremism are characterized by perceptions of being under siege and by lack of faith in nonviolent means of change.

The Cold War II characterization also assumes that Muslim grievances are rooted in a rejection of modernity and Western values, not specific policies. Empirical evidence indicates otherwise.

For instance, while the U.S. and Britain are generally viewed unfavorably, Muslim opinions of France and Germany are relatively positive, even when compared with respondents' opinion of other Muslim nations. This suggests that negative sentiment is drawn along policy, not cultural or religious, lines.

Moreover, despite intense political anger at some Western powers, Muslims do not reject Western values wholesale. Citizens of countries from Saudi Arabia to Morocco, from Indonesia to Pakistan, express admiration for Western technology and democratic values such as freedom of the press and government accountability. In fact, terrorism sympathizers are more likely than the majority to say that greater democracy will help Muslims progress.

Defining the current conflict as a battle between Western values and "radical Islam" misses the root cause of terrorism while energizing the very perceptions that fuel sympathy for it-that Islam itself is under attack. These findings begin to expose the danger of acting on the Cold War II analogy. The current war is about not appearing to denigrate Islam or promote Western imperialism, because it is these very perceptions that fuel extremist sentiment.