| Hamas and Fatah | | Print | |
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Page 3 of 4 Although the above points hardly exhaust the document’s overall significance, alone they stand as a symbol of great importance for establishing Palestinian political unity. Consider first that Hamas has never fully accepted the idea of two states as a meaningful goal for the Palestinian national cause.[3] Until now, the movement has remained steadfast in its position that the land of Palestine is an Islamic trust and therefore incompatible with the presence of the Israeli state. Yet by endorsing the principles of the document, Hamas implicitly recognized the Israeli state, even if only temporarily. It also suggests that the movement is once again employing political pragmatism as a method for confronting an uncertain future. Indeed, the idea that the Palestinian president will carry the burden of negotiations4 with Israel lets Hamas have its ideological cake and eat it too. Not only does the political division of labor leave Hamas safely behind its charter while the president confronts the distasteful job of negotiations, but it also lets democracy smooth out tensions between its ideological positions and the practical need for an end to the occupation.
Pragmatics cannot be limited to words alone. Thus in an effort
to resolve their differences and transform the prisoners’ document into
a meaningful agreement, Hamas and Fatah agreed that it was time to
realize the vision of the sixth point and form a national unity
government. The decision to form the new government did not necessarily
reflect political goodwill alone. The Palestinian government and people
were under enormous pressure from Israel (through brutal military
incursions and the refusal to give the Palestinians their share of
much-needed taxes), the United States and the European Union. As early
as February 2005,5 the United States declared its intention to use
economic sanctions and political isolation to force the Palestinians to
withdraw their support for Hamas and undermine their democratic choice.
The Hamas-led government was immediately deprived of
approximately $60 million per month, which Israel claimed was due
primarily to the group’s refusal to recognize Israel. Following suit,
the United States decided to withhold its share of Palestinian aid,
which amounts to about $420 million per year. The European Union, the
largest contributor of aid to the Palestinian Authority, also declared
its support for the economic sanctions and cut off most of its $600
million donations. Add this to the fact that even Arab and Muslim
states have curbed their meager support for the Palestinian government,
and you get a society that is on the verge of collapse.
Economic pressure, while critical, was not the only step taken
to annihilate the new Hamas government. On June 10, 2006, two months
after Ehud Olmert officially became the prime minister, the Israeli
Defense Force shelled a Gaza beach,6 killing seven members of a
Palestinian family. Not long after, Israeli rocket attacks killed
scores of Palestinian civilians, culminating in the so-called Summer
Rains offensive in which more than 150 Palestinian civilians were
killed in Gaza alone. Politically, neither the United States nor the EU
criticized Israel’s actions and remained firmly behind their position
on the economic sanctions.
Faced with these challenges, Hamas and Fatah could no longer
afford (nor, for that matter, could the Palestinians) the luxury of
political divisions. In early September 2006, both groups confirmed
their pledge to end their political differences and challenge the
unjust sanctions by forming a national unity government. Shortly
thereafter, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas attended a UN General
Assembly meeting where he expected to garner support for the effort to
form a new government and kick start peace talks. During his stay, he
met with Israeli officials and US President George Bush, who expressed
limited support for the plan. Rather than embrace Abbas’ proposal for
renewed peace negotiations, Bush simply reaffirmed his support for the
“moderate” leader and sent him home empty-handed.
Since December 2006, 100 Palestinians have been killed as a
result of internal fighting between Fatah and Hamas loyalists; no less
than 33 were killed during the last three days. But as the battle rages
on, the signs of a new political horizon are emerging in the east.
Symbolically hosted by the Saudi Kingdom in Mecca, the birthplace of
Islam, recent Palestinian negotiations have produced the basis for a
new Hamas-led government, with Haniyeh as Prime Minister and an as-yet
unidentified member of Fatah as acting deputy prime minister.
Addressing international concerns, the plan also has the feature of
“respecting” past PLO agreements signed with Israel, a position Hamas
has, until now, rejected. So far, most of the plan remains undisclosed
and perhaps undetermined. Thus it looks more like a sketch than an
architectural blueprint for unity.
But despite its limitations, the agreement nevertheless signals
a new step towards the realization of the elusive goal of unity. Until
now, most efforts have faltered under Abbas’s leadership, whose
commitment to serving the twin masters of Israel and the US has placed
him within an untenable political position vis-à-vis Hamas. Abandoning
the Prisoners’ Document, Abbas has often distanced himself from the
most realistic framework for securing a unity government and further
alienated himself from the Palestinian people. Perhaps more
importantly, the Mecca agreement also suggests that Fatah’s position as
an Israeli/US proxy is still incomplete and, potentially, preventable.
Recently, the US offered $86 million of support for Abbas claiming its
commitment to “boosting” the “moderate” leader. In addition, a recent
shipment of arms to Abbas’ executive guard suggests the possibility of
an intense struggle under the Jewish state’s authorization and direct
support. But if the agreement holds, then perhaps Fatah can refrain
from playing the colonial role of proxy and work towards uniting the
people under its own conditions. |