| Hamas and Fatah | | Print | |
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Page 2 of 4 Pragmatism aside, Hamas has nevertheless remained an essential component of the fragmented arena of Palestinian politics. Propagating an “Islamic” solution to the ongoing problem of statelessness, Hamas has used militancy and charity work to secure its place in the struggle, although often at the expense of national unity. During the Oslo Accords, for example, the organization led multiple attacks on Israelis in an attempt to derail negotiations and boost its image as a resistance movement. Although the group succeeded in advancing both goals, it also led to a stiffening of power politics within Fatah, which rightfully perceived the group to be an increasing threat to its ever-expanding powers. Hamas also furthered the polarization of Palestinian factions that resulted in a growing divide between the Islamic and secular approach to their plight. Supporters of both movements began to treat each other as impediments to their own agendas at the expense of the collective need for a united front against Israel’s colonization.
In Oslo’s wake, Hamas capitalized on Fatah’s largely discredited
efforts to deliver a solution to Palestinian suffering. Increasing its
militant stance against the Israeli occupation, most notably in the
form of suicide operations, Hamas managed to elaborate its role in the
Palestinian resistance at a heavy price. On the one hand, Hamas sent a
message to Palestinians that, unlike Fatah, it could sucker punch the
mighty Israeli Goliath. With Arafat trapped in his Ramallah compound,
Hamas led the Palestinian resistance while garnering popular support.
In this context, even Israel’s attempts to destroy Hamas’ leadership
boosted the group’s image as a grassroots resistance movement. On the
other hand, Hamas’ attacks gave meaning to Israel’s identity as the
victim, which legitimized unprecedented assaults on Palestinian
civilians, such as the Jenin massacre in 2002. Employing the discourse
of the “war on terror,” Israel used Hamas’ suicide operations as a
pretext for a full-scale reoccupation of the West Bank and massive
military campaigns against mostly civilian populations, many of whom
paid with their lives. Thus, like a double-edged sword, Hamas’
militancy cut both ways.
Today, Hamas’ electoral victory says as much about Fatah’s
failures as it does about the shifting tides of Palestinian natio-nal
politics. Since Oslo, Fatah’s record as a Palestinian movement has been
tarnished by corruption and an insatiable thirst for power. Built on
the pillars of nepotism and empty promises, the group failed to advance
Palestinian goals and sacrificed its image on the altar of power in the
form of the Palestinian Authority. But Hamas’ success can’t be
explained by Fatah’s failures alone. Since its establishment in the
late 1980s, the movement has worked hard to develop an ideological
platform that challenges secular nationalism with a homegrown idea:
Islam. Within this approach, Palestinians found a long-term vision
built on the principles of moral reform and a stiff resistance. Thus,
on election day, Hamas not only presented a competing narrative for the
Palestinian struggle, but also reclaimed a position of strength
grounded in its refusal to compromise.
It is within the context of this political history, then, that
we can meaningfully speak of the internal Palestinian crisis. To this
day, Palestinians have been struggling for a common goal, and have been
frustrated by internal divisions and the absence of an integrated
framework for confronting Israeli colonization and leading the national
movement. Hamas’ electoral success has yet to solve this problem. Even
though it has only been in the government for a short time, the period
has been marked by factional tensions and occasional hints of what some
fear could be a looming civil war or another “Algerian scenario.” In
addition, its refusal to accept the Quartet’s terms for negotiations
has led to international sanctions that amount to nothing short of
collective punishment of the entire Palestinian people. Thus, although
its promise to take a stiff position vis-à-vis the Israeli occupation
was once an empowering electoral step, it has only furthered
Palestinian suffering and isolation in the international realm.
Political turmoil aside, the Hamas government can be credited
with (at least) facilitating two unprecedented steps toward creating a
solid base for Palestinian unity. The first is the Palestinian National
Accord. Faced with the simple fact that neither Fatah nor Hamas seemed
able to resolve their rivalry and that Palestinian life was
deteriorating rapidly as a result, members of leading Palestinian
factions decided to draft a political blueprint for national unity.
Named after its authors, who remain in Israeli jails, the prisoners’
document consisted of 18 points representing an agreement reached by
members of Fatah, Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and
Islamic Jihad.
Cutting across ideological lines, the document called for the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank,
Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, and remained committed to the right of
return for all refugees. It also set forth the goal of integrating the
resistance into one united body designed to coordinate defense and
attacks within the 1967 borders. But the document’s greatest success
was reflected in the goal of forming a national unity government based
on the 2005 Cairo initiative, which would include Hamas and Islamic
Jihad in the PLO. |