| Why Tariq Ramadan? | | Print | |
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Page 3 of 3 NOT EVEN THE POPE IS WELCOME The fact that Notre Dame, a Catholic Jesuit university, was Dr. Ramadan’s sponsoring institution also likely carries some important symbolism. In 1999 another Jesuit university, Georgetown, was the first university in the U.S. to hire a Muslim chaplain. The Papacy was quite critical of the current administration, particularly over the handling of the war in Iraq, in addition to its overall strategy for the war on terror. An article published in the New York Times on October 6th, 2004 stated that Notre Dame hired Ramadan in part because “[he] is a practicing Muslim and not a detached scholar, giving him greater authority when he talks about the Koran as a ‘living text’ open to contemporary interpretations.” By refusing Notre Dame’s request and subsequent overtures to allow Ramadan to teach this year, the current administration may be further demonstrating its resolve and willingness to promote a focused agenda with regards to addressing the rise of Islamic extremism. By marginalizing existing “Islamists” and preventing new ones from entering the field, policy makers along with “anti-Islamists” are creating a context that is increasingly hostile to moderates like Ramadan, who generate legitimacy and authenticity from within the religion. They are also making it difficult for other academic or civic institutions, like the Jesuit community in America, to reach out to moderate voices like Tariq Ramadan in an effort to engage the Islamic world. Yet for all the rhetoric and elaborate behind closed doors machinations, a Protestant style Islamic reformation seems no more likely to occur in America or anywhere in the Muslim World now than it did 25 years ago, or 125 years ago for that matter. When not vilifying Islamists, Pipes is extolling the eloquence and courage of a handful of what he considers Islamic moderates. In a September 23rd article published in the New York Post, Pipes identifies a number of these moderates in addition to a handful of moderate organizations. It remains to be seen whether any of these people, which include Irshad Manji, will generate a significant following within the Muslim community in America or abroad. Manji, who seems to be one of Pipes’ favorites, may herself demonstrate why such a strategy is unlikely to succeed. Manji, who professes Islam as her faith, advocates theological positions entirely unacceptable to vast majority of Muslims. Her arguments eschew authenticity and legitimacy from a Muslim perspective in favor of appealing to western sentiments regarding religious reform. The result is a Muslim reformer who is much more popular with non- Muslims than with Muslims. Pipes is aware that his moderate voices are not generating the necessary impact. In an article published in the New York Post in September of 2003, he argues that “for [moderates] to be heard over the Islamist din requires help from the outside—– celebration by governments, grants from foundations, recognition by the media and attention from the academy.” For Pipes, Ramadan is part and parcel of the “Islamist din” that must be marginalized, whereas Manji is deserving of widespread institutional support. Considering the amount of adoration Manji receives from the media, thus far his wishes have been granted. INEFFECTIVE STRATEGY What is more likely to happen is that such support will be recognized by the Muslim community in North America as an ill conceived strategic attempt by policy makers to instruct Muslims on how they should understand and practice Islam. A critical assumption made by Pipes and others is that Islam can be reduced to ideology and deconstructed like communism, or Marxism. The depth and breadth of Islam’s year old historical, political and religious record is far too wide ranging to succumb to such a process. In the Boston Phoenix article published in December of 2001 Pipes states that he envisions a scenario not unlike the Cold War. “I’m happy to be a cold warrior with different clothes,” said Pipes, with a nod to his famous father, Harvard professor and cold warrior Richard Pipes. “The cold warriors were right” he added. Applying lessons learned from the Cold war to the war against “Islamism” will undoubtedly result in miscalculations, and may ultimately create a reaction within the Muslim community that encourages extremism and marginalizes moderation. Along the same lines, initiating a Protestant style Islamic reformation does neither justice to Islam, nor the original reformation. The excesses of the Church that provoked Luther’s reformation do not share an analogous status with the excesses of extremism in Islam. The Catholic Church is vested with divine power through scriptural and theological mandate. The impetus for Luther’s reforms were structural and found in the abuse of this power by the Church. In Islam, extremists like Osama bin Laden have no scholarly legitimacy or authority. Their fatwas are not binding on anyone and they have no claim to represent any form of orthodoxy. In this sense, Bin Laden and other extremists have no religious authority to abuse, but rather generate support through demagoguery and exploitation of the passions of oppressed and disgruntled masses. Attempting to address the extremism of Bin Laden through structural reform of Islam misunderstands the sources of support for fundamentalism in Muslim world. THE NEED FOR LEGITIMACY On April 10th, 2003, in a Special Policy Forum Report for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Daniel Pipes argued that “the United States can promote a modern, moderate, goodneighborly version of Islam, but it cannot on its own ensure the ascendancy of such a version. Only Muslims can do this.” Pipes underscores the fact that for any understanding of Islam to become dominant or influential, it must come from the Muslim community. However, using national security or any other vehicle as a pretext to influence the version of Islam to be accepted by Muslims comes across as disingenuous and short sighted. If policy makers do assume Pipes’ approach in promoting a particular version of Islam, they threaten to make the collective endeavor of rooting out extremism an antagonistic as opposed to cooperative venture. Since 9/11, the Muslim community in America is undergoing a dramatic period of self evaluation, a process which led to the emergence of a number of different perspectives that address the issue of extremism. Their appearance demonstrates at the very least an organic connection to the communities which they seek to represent. In this sense, Pipes would be better served by engaging Muslim leaders legitimated by their communities as opposed to legitimizing leaders for them. Tariq Ramadan’s case in particular is unique in that his broad based appeal would likely serve to facilitate cooperation amongst these perspectives. As the nation-building process in Iraq clearly demonstrates, attempting to instruct a people on how they should live is fraught with unforeseeable pitfalls and difficulties. One can only imagine the perils of instructing a people on how they should believe and practice their religion. Pipes and policy makers who follow him must understand that attempting to initiate reform of Islam via ideologies and mechanisms foreign to its theological and historical reality is a dangerous experiment; one that is more likely to galvanize extremists and further marginalize moderate voices. A more congenial alternative is to look to those within the Muslim world that seek to transcend the events of radicalism and fundamentalism. Islamic civilization has an established history of tolerance and cooperation. Policy makers and academics in the West should help Muslims rediscover this tradition. To ask otherwise would be the equivalent of the Muslim world instructing the West on the finer points of progressive liberal democracy. |